Introduction
In May 1980 Sir Richard Kirby, chairman of Australia's Advertising Standards Council and a retired judge from the industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Commission, ruled that a cigarette advertising campaign for Winfield cigarettes, featuring the popular Australian entertainer Paul Hogan, was in breach of the council's voluntary advertising code for cigarettes' (see Appendix) and should be withdrawn from all forms of publication and display. The ruling sent shock waves through the tobacco and advertising industries in Australia, since it represented not only a substantial direct loss to the tobacco company itself but also a major blow to the selfregulatory system which had been established and administered by the tobacco, advertising, and media industries.
The action that led to the ruling was initiated by a small group of health workers without backing from their Government employers. It represented a victory of David over Goliath and contains several lessons for those seeking to restrict the promotional activities of multinational tobacco companies.
Advertising of Winfield cigarettes
Winfield was introduced on to the Australian market in 1973 by Rothmans These words are an admission of the inherent inoperability of clause 4 of the code. It is disturbing that they should have come from a representative of a Government health commission, for someone representing the health interests of a State might have been expected to have made such a conclusion in the context of a stand against the code. Instead the Government medical representative and other health department representatives on the working party unwittingly aligned themselves with the vested interests seeking to uphold the code as a viable regulatory mechanism.
A final hearing on the Winfield case was held on 2 May 1980. A recent joint survey by MOP UP and the Australian Consumers' Association of 475 12-15-year-olds which showed Winfield to be their clear and unchallenged cigarette of choice was submitted as further evidence along with a petition from psychologists and psychiatrists stating that their professional opinion was that Hogan was a strong role model for young adolescents and a declaration by a lecturer in psycholinguistics that the complainants' interpretation of the words "major appeal" was sound. Rothmans, Winfield's owners, based their defence of Hogan on the argument that the corollary of "major appeal to children" was "minor appeal to adults." Since Hogan was also popular with adults, Rothmans claimed that clause 4 of the code was not applicable in the case of Hogan. The time that elapsed from Carmichael's first complaint to the final hearing and ruling against the use of Hogan in Winfield was 18 months to the day.
Aftermath and conclusions
Rothmans were clearly confident that the complaint would not be upheld, as shown by their substantial investment in a proposed relaunch featuring Hogan. Rothmans had the option of ignoring the Kirby ruling, as it was not enforceable by law. Indeed this was apparently discussed by its management,3 but a decision was taken to abide by the ruling.
The Advertising Federation of Australia responded to the ruling by suggesting that all regulatory codes should be subject to an urgent and critical review to test their compatibility with the advertising industry creed "If it's legal to sell, it should be legal to advertise."8 This suggestion indicates that the industry cannot tolerate a self-regulation system that actually regulates advertising, but still sees that some form of "complaint-proof" code is needed.
This story reveals crucial aspects of the voluntary code and the Media Council's role in its operation as the appearance of self-regulation in the absence of actual self-regulation.9 The code is the embodiment of a carefully and, until the Hogan case, successfully stage-managed public relations effort by the industries concerned to divert any attempt at Government regulation or banning. While Rothmans's agreement to comply with the ruling against Hogan may seem a remarkable sacrifice for private enterprise to have made, it is merely a gesture in comparison to the far wider issue of self-regulation being preserved.
At the time when the tobacco and media industries drafted the voluntary code in 1977 there was virtually no organised public opposition to cigarette advertising in Australia. The industries clearly did not envisage a group like MOP ULP emerging, and their lack of vigilance in anticipating concerted attempts at challenging the code's clauses is perhaps the overriding factor responsible for their loss. There are several other factors which, in retrospect, can be seen to have been vital to the case reaching the conclusion that it did. The willingness of certain sections of the Australian press and media to cover the progress of the case was central among these. The complainant Carmichael could easily have been dismissed by the Advertising Standards Council as a socially invisible "nut-case," whose complaints on plain paper could be fobbed off in the council's own good time. The formation of MOP UP around Carmichael's complaint transformed the situation from one of "irate (somewhat extreme) citizen" versus "virtually unknown industrial regulatory body" to the much more newsworthy conflict of "concerned group of citizens" versus "the nasty tobacco industry, trying to influence our children."
Tactically MOP UP withheld the story of their complaints until enough examples of conflict, such as overly delayed responses from the council, were available to create a good "story" for the media. The angles of tobacco companies trying to influence children and of ordinary concerned citizens trying to get satisfaction from big business and the continual passage of time between the first complaint and the opportunity to have a judgment by an independent judge were emphasised. MOP UP was able to get news coverage from both the in-depth programmes, concerned at the wider implications of the action, and from the "heart-strings" press via the mythological themes of, "Can the little man win ?" and, "Against all odds, can they do something about our children being seduced into smoking ?" Journalists' questioning consistently revealed these themes as holding the news value of the whole procedure.
The question of whether the industry was capable of selfregulation was not newsworthy and seldom survived editing. But it was undoubtedly the joker in the pack. The self-regulation system, designed by the industry as a fend against the threat of Government regulation, must also be seen as a weapon that could be used by tobacco companies against one another in the competitive struggle for market share. Had they elected to ignore the Kirby ruling, Rothmans would have drawn strong protest from their competitors as undermining the industry's "gentleman's agreement" to abide by the code.
The action described in this paper was undertaken by people working in health education who were each critical of the dominant individual-oriented approach in Australian 
